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Abstract
Frequency competition influences capacity allocation decisions in airline markets and
has important implications to airline profitability and airport congestion. Market share
of a competing airline is a function of its frequency share and the relationship between
the two is pivotal for understanding the impacts of frequency competition on airline busi-
ness. Based on the most commonly accepted form of this relationship, we propose a
game-theoretic model of airline frequency competition. We characterize the conditions
for existence and uniqueness of a Nash equilibrium for the 2-player case. We analyze
two different myopic learning dynamics for the non-equilibrium situations and prove their
convergence to Nash equilibrium under mild conditions. For the N-player game between
identical players, we characterize all the pure strategy equilibria and identify the worst-
case equilibrium, i.e. the equilibrium with maximum total cost. We provide an expression
for the measure of inefficiency, similar to the price of anarchy, which is the ratio of the
total cost of the worst-case equilibrium to the total cost of the cost minimizing solution
and investigate its dependence on different parameters of the game.
1 Introduction
Since the deregulation of US domestic airline business in the 1970’s, airlines have used fare
and service frequency as the two most important instruments of competition. Passengers have
greatly benefitted from fare competition, which has resulted in a substantial decrease in real
(inflation adjusted) airfares over the years. On the other hand, frequency competition has
resulted in availability of more options for air travel. The benefits of increased competition to
the airlines themselves are not as obvious. Throughout the post-deregulation period, airline
profits have been highly volatile. Several major US carriers have made substantial losses over
the last decade with some of them filing for Chapter 11 bankruptcy and some others narrowly
escaping bankruptcy. Provision of excess capacity is one of the reasons often cited for the poor
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economic health of airlines. Due to the so called S-curve relationship [5] between market share
and frequency share, an airline is expected to attract disproportionately more passengers by
increasing its frequency share in a market. To increase their market share, airlines engage in
frequency competition by providing more flights per day on competitive routes. As a result, they
prefer operating many flights with small aircraft rather than operating fewer flights with larger
aircraft. The average aircraft sizes in domestic US markets have been falling continuously over
the last couple of decades in spite of increasing passenger demand [6]. Similarly, the average
load factors, i.e. the ratio of the number of passengers to the number of seats, on some of the
most competitive and high demand markets have been found to be lower than the industry
average.
Apart from the chronic worries about the industry’s financial health, worsening congestion
and delays at the major US airports has become another cause of serious concern. Increases in
passenger demand, coupled with decreases in average aircraft size have led to a great increase
in the number of flights being operated, especially between the major airports, leading to
congestion. The US Congress Joint Economic Committee has estimated that in calendar year
2007, delays cost around $18 billion to the airlines and another $12 billion to passengers [20].
Thus, frequency competition affects airlines’ capacity allocation decisions, which in turn
have a strong impact on airline profitability, as well as on airport congestion. In this paper,
we propose a game theoretic framework, which is consistent with the most prevalent model of
frequency competition. Section 2 provides background on airline schedule planning and reviews
the literature on frequency competition. Section 3 presents the N-player game model. Best
response curves are characterized in section 4. In section 5, we focus on the 2-player game. We
provide the conditions for existence and uniqueness of a Nash equilibrium and discuss realistic
parameter ranges. We then provide two different myopic learning models for the 2-player game
and provide proof of their convergence to the Nash equilibrium. In section 6, we identify all
possible equilibria in a N-player game with identical players and find the worst-case equilibrium.
In section 7, we evaluate the price of anarchy and establish the dependence of airline profitability
and airport congestion on airline frequency competition. We conclude with a summary of main
results in section 8.
2 Frequency Planning under Competition
The airline planning process involves decisions ranging from long-term strategic decisions such
as fleet planning and route planning, to medium-term decisions about schedule development [4].
Fleet planning is the process of determining the composition of a fleet of aircraft, and involves
decisions about acquiring new aircraft and retiring existing aircraft in the fleet. Given a fleet,
the second step in the airline planning process involves the choice of routes to be flown, and
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is known as the route planning process. A route is a combination of origin and destination
airports (occasionally with intermediate stops) between which flights are to be operated. Route
planning decisions take into account the expected profitability of a route based on demand and
revenue projections as well as the overall structure of the airline’s network. Given a set of
selected routes, the next step in the planning process is airline schedule development, which in
itself is a combination of decisions about frequency, departure times and aircraft sizes for each
route, and aircraft rotations over the network.
Frequency planning is the part of the airline schedule development process that involves
decisions about the number of flights to be operated on each route. By providing more frequency
on a route, an airline can attract more passengers. Given an estimate of total demand on a
route, the market share of each airline depends on its own frequency as well as on competitor
frequency. The S-curve or sigmoidal relationship between the market share and frequency
share is a widely accepted notion in the airline industry [17][5]. However, it is difficult to trace
the origins and evolution of this S-shaped relationship in the airline literature [10]. Empirical
evidence of the relationship was documented in some early studies and regression analysis was
used to estimate the model parameters [23][22][21]. Over the years, there have been several
references to the S-curve including Kahn [14] and Baseler [3]. A recent empirical study by
Button and Drexler [10] suggests a somewhat different trend. While reporting some evidence
of the S-curve relationship in the early 1990’s, they observe a much flatter linear relationship
between market share and frequency share in the early 2000’s. In another recent study, Wei
and Hansen [24] provide statistical support for the S-curve effect of airline frequency on market
shares, based on a nested logit model for non-stop duopoly markets. In this paper, we use a
more general model that is compatible with the linear, as well as the S-curve assumptions. The
mathematical expression for the S-curve relationship [21][5] is given by:
MSi =
FSαi∑n
j=1 FS
α
j
(1)
for parameter α such that α > 1, where MSi = market share of airline i, FSi = frequency
share of airline i and n = number of competing airlines.
Empirical studies have shown that the typical values of α range between 1.3 and 1.7, with
α = 1.5 being a good representative value. This model is general enough to even accommodate
the linear relationship suggested by Button and Drexler, by setting α = 1.
Many of these studies go on to discuss the financial implications of the S-curve. Button and
Drexler [10] associate it with provision of ”excess capacity” and an ”ever-expanding number of
flights”, while O’Connor [17] associates it with ”an inherent tendency to overschedule”. Kahn
goes even further and raises the question of whether it is possible at all to have a financially
strong and yet highly competitive airline industry at the same time [17].
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Despite continuing interest in frequency competition based on the S-curve phenomenon,
literature on game theoretic aspects of such competition is limited. Hansen [12] analyzed
frequency competition in a hub-dominated environment using a strategic form game model.
Dobson and Lederer [11] modeled schedule and fare competition as a strategic form game. Adler
[1] used an extensive form game model to analyze airlines competing on fare, frequency and
aircraft sizes. Each of these three studies adopted a successive optimizations approach to solve
for a Nash equilibrium. Only Hansen [12] mentions some of the issues regarding convergence
through discussion of different possible cases. But none of these three studies provides any
conditions for convergence properties of the algorithm. Wei and Hansen [25] analyze three
different models of airline competition and solve for equilibrium through explicit enumeration
of the entire strategy space. Brander and Zhang [7] and Aguirregabiria and Ho [2] model
airline competition as a dynamic game and estimate the model parameters using empirical
data. Norman and Strandens [16] also calibrate model parameters using empirical data but
for a strategic form game. None of the studies mentioned so far provides any guarantee or
conditions for existence or uniqueness of a pure strategy equilibrium. Brueckner and Flores-
Fillol [9] and Brueckner [8] obtain closed form expressions for equilibrium decisions analytically.
They focus on symmetric equilibria while ignoring the possibility of any unsymmetric equilibria.
Most of the previous studies involving game theoretic analysis of frequency competition, such
as Adler [1], Pels et. al [18], Hansen [12], Wei and Hansen [25], Aguirregabiria and Ho [2],
Dobson and Lederer [11], Hong and Harker [13], model market share using Logit or nested
Logit type models, with utility typically being an affine function of the inverse of frequency.
Such relationships can be substantially different from the S-shaped relationship between market
share and frequency share, depending on the exact values of utility parameters.
All of these studies involve finding a Nash equilibrium or some refinement of it. But there
isn’t sufficient justification of the predictive power of the equilibrium concept. Hansen [12]
provides some discussion of the shapes of best response curves and stability of equilibrium
points. But none of the studies has focused on any learning dynamics through which less than
perfectly rational players may eventually reach the equilibrium state. In this paper, we analyze
a strategic form game among airlines with frequency of service being the only decision variable.
We will only consider pure strategies of the players, i.e. we will assume that the frequency
decisions made by the airlines are deterministic. We use the Nash equilibrium solution concept
under pure strategy assumption. The research contributions of this study are threefold. First,
we make use of the S-curve relationship between market share and frequency share and analyze
its impact on the existence and uniqueness of pure strategy Nash equilibria. Second, we provide
reasonable learning dynamics and provide theoretical proof for their convergence to the unique
Nash equilibrium for the 2-player game. Third, we provide a measure of inefficiency, similar
to the price of anarchy, of a system of competing profit-maximizing airlines in comparison to a
system with centralized control. This measure can be used as a proxy to understand the effects
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of frequency competition on airline profitability and airport congestion.
3 Model
Let M be the total market size i.e. the number of passengers wishing to travel from a particular
origin to a particular destination on a non-stop flight. In general, an airline passenger may have
more than one flight in his itinerary. Conversely, two passengers on the same flight may have
different origins and/or destinations. But for our analysis, we will ignore these network effects
and assume the origin and destination pair of airports to be isolated from the rest of the
network. Let I = {1, 2, ..., n} be the set of airlines competing in a particular non-stop market.
Although most of the major airlines today follow the practices of differential pricing and revenue
management, we will assume that the airfare charged by each airline remains constant across
all passengers. Let pi be the fare charged by each airline i. Further, we will assume that the
type and seating capacity of aircraft to be operated on this non-stop route are known. Let Si
be the seating capacities for airline i and Ci be the operating cost per flight for airline i. Let α
be the parameter in the S-curve relationship. A typical value suggested by literature is around
1.5. To keep our analysis general, we assume that 1 < α < 2. Our results are applicable even in
the case of a linear relationship between market share and frequency share by taking the limit
as α→ 1+.
Assumption 1. 1 < α < 2
Let xi be the frequency of airline i. As per the S-curve relationship between market share
and frequency share, the ith airline’s share of the market (MSi) is given by:
MSi =
xαi
n∑
j=1
xαj
.
This is obtained by multiplying the numerator and denominator of the right hand side of
equation (1) by
(∑n
j=1 xj
)α
. The number of passengers (PAXi) traveling on airline i is given
by:
PAXi = min
M x
α
i
n∑
j=1
xαj
, Sixi
 .
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Airline i’s profit (Πi) is given by:
Πi = pi ∗min
M x
α
i
n∑
j=1
xαj
, Sixi
− Cixi.
We will assume that for every i, Ci < piSi. In other words, the total operating cost of a flight
is lower than the total revenue generated when the flight is completely filled. This assumption
is reasonable because if it is violated for some airline i, then there is a trivial optimal solution
xi = 0 for that airline.
Assumption 2. Ci < piSi ∀i ∈ I
4 Best Response Curves
Let us define the effective competitor frequency, yi =
(∑
j∈I,j 6=i x
α
j
)1/α
, and
Πi = min(Π
′
i,Π
′′
i )
where, Π′i = Mpi
xαi
xαi + y
α
i
− Cixi and Π′′i = piSixi − Cixi.
Π′i is a twice continuously differentiable function of xi.
∂Π′i
∂xi
=
Mpiαx
α−1
i y
α
i
(xαi + y
α
i )
2 − Ci
and
∂2Π′i
∂x2i
=
Mpiαx
α−2
i y
α
i
(xαi + y
α
i )
3 ((α− 1) yαi − (α + 1)xαi ) .
Π′i has a single point of contraflexure at xi = yi
(
α−1
α+1
)1/α
such that the function is strictly
convex for all lower values of xi and strictly concave for all higher values of xi. Π
′
i can have at
most two points of zero slope (stationary points). If two such points exist, then the one with
lower xi will be a local minima in the convex region and the one with higher xi will be a local
maxima in the concave region. Therefore, Π′i has at most one local maximum and exactly one
boundary point at xi = 0. Therefore, global maxima of Π
′
i will be at either of these two points.
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Π′′i is a linear function of xi with a positive slope. For a given combination of parameters α, M ,
pi, Ci, Si and a given effective competitor frequency yi, the global maximum of Πi can satisfy
any one of the following three cases. These three cases are also illustrated in figures 1, 2 and 3
respectively.
Case A: Π′i ≤ 0 for all xi > 0. Under this case, either a local maximum does not exist for Π′i
or it exists but value of the function Π′i at that point is negative. In this case, a global maximum
of Πi (xi) is at xi = 0. This describes a situation where the effective competitor frequency is so
large that airline i cannot earn a positive profit at any frequency. Therefore, the best response
of airline i is to have a zero frequency, i.e. not to operate any flights in that market.
Case B: Local maximum of Π′i exists and the value of the function Π
′
i at that local maximum
is positive and less than or equal to Π′′i (xi). In this case, the unique global maximum of Πi (xi)
exists at the local maximum of Π′i (xi). In this case, the optimum frequency is positive and at
this frequency, airline i earns the maximum profit that it could have earned had the aircraft
seating capacity been infinite.
Case C: A local maximum of Π′i exists in the concave part and the value of the function
Π′i (xi) at this local maximum is greater than Π
′′
i (xi). In this case, Π
′
i (xi) and Π
′′
i (xi) intersect
at two distinct points (apart from xi = 0). The unique global maximum of Πi (xi) exists at the
point of intersection with highest xi value. This describes the case where optimum frequency
is positive and greater than the optimum frequency under the assumption of infinite aircraft
seating capacity. At this frequency, airline i earns lower profit than the maximum profit it could
have earned had the aircraft seating capacity been infinite.
Π′i (0) = 0 and for very low positive values of xi,
∂Π′i
∂xi
is negative. Therefore, at the first
stationary point (the one with lower xi value), the Π
′
i function value will be negative. Moreover,
as yi tends to infinity, Π
′
i is negative for any finite value of xi. Therefore, Π
′
i (xi) > 0 for some xi
if and only if Π′i (x
′
i) > 0 for some stationary point x
′
i. For a given combination of parameters α,
M , pi, Ci and Si, there exists a threshold value of effective competitor frequency yi such that,
for any yi value above this threshold, Π
′
i (xi) ≤ 0 for all xi > 0 and therefore the best response
of airline i is xi = 0. Let us denote this threshold by yth and the corresponding xi value as xth.
At xi = xth and yi = yth,
Π′i = 0,
∂Π′i
∂xi
= 0,
∂2Π′i
∂x2i
≤ 0
⇒ xth = (α− 1) Mpi
αCi
and yth = (α− 1)
α−1
α
Mpi
αCi
.
Of course, at yi = yth, xi = 0 is also optimal. It turns out that it is the only yi value at
which there is more than one best response possible. This situation is unlikely to be observed in
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Figure 1: Case A
Figure 2: Case B
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Figure 3: Case C
real world examples, because the parameters of the model are all real numbers with continuous
distributions. So the probability of observing this exact idiosyncratic case is zero. If we arbi-
trarily assume that in the event of two optimal frequencies, an airline chooses the greater of the
two values, then the best response correspondence reduces to a function which we will refer to
as the best response function. The existence of two different maximum values at yi = yth means
that the best response correspondence is not always convex valued. Therefore, in general, a
pure strategy Nash equilibrium may or may not exist for this game.
For yi values slightly below yth, the global maximum of Πi corresponds to the stationary
point of Π′i in the concave part as described in case B above. Therefore, for yi values slightly
below yth, at the stationary point of Π
′
i in the concave part, Π
′
i < Π
′′
i . However, as yi → 0,
argmax(Π′i (xi)) → 0. Therefore, the argmax(Πi (xi)) exists at the point of intersection of Π′i
and Π′′i curves, as explained in case C above. For yi values slightly above 0, at the stationary
point of Π′i in the concave part, Π
′
i > Π
′′
i . Therefore by continuity, for some yi such that
0 ≤ yi ≤ yth, there exists xi such that, Π′i = Π′′i , ∂Π
′
i
∂xi
= 0 and
∂2Π′i
∂x2i
≤ 0. It turns out that there
is only one such yi value that satisfies these conditions. Let us denote this yi value by ycr, since
this is critical value of effective competitor frequency such that case B prevails for higher yi
values (as long as yi ≤ yth) and case C prevails for all lower yi values. The value of ycr and the
corresponding xi value, xcr, is given by,
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xcr =
M
Si
(
1− Ci
αpiSi
)
and ycr =
M
Si
(
1− Ci
αpiSi
)
(
αpiSi
Ci
− 1
) 1
α
.
For yi = 0, as xi → 0+, Π′i keeps increasing and Π′′i keeps decreasing. However, Π′′i < Π′i for
sufficiently low values of xi. Therefore, Πi is maximized when Π
′
i = Π
′′
i . Let us denote this xi
value as x0. It is easy to see that x0 =
M
Si
. We will denote the range of yi values with yi ≥ yth
as region A, ycr ≤ yi < yth as region B and yi < ycr as range C.
In region C, Πi is maximized for a unique xi value such that Π
′
i = Π
′′
i and
∂Π′i
∂xi
≤ 0. The
equality condition translates into,
M
Si
xα−1i − xαi = yαi . (2)
The left hand side (LHS) of equation (2) is strictly concave because 1 < α < 2. Further,
the LHS is maximized at xi =
α−1
α
M
Si
. The maximum value of LHS is at yi = (α− 1)
α−1
α M
αSi
. So
for every yi value, there are two corresponding xi values satisfying equation (2) that correspond
to the two points of intersection of the Π′i and Π
′′
i curves. The one corresponding to the
higher xi value is of interest to us. That always corresponds to xi values greater than
α−1
α
M
Si
.
Differentiating both sides of equation (2) with respect to yi,
∂xi
∂yi
= α
yα−1i
xα−2i
1
(α− 1) M
Si
− αxi
< 0.
So the best response of airline i in region C is strictly decreasing. Let us again differentiate
with respect to yi to obtain the second derivative of best response xi,
∂2xi
∂y2i
=
(
∂xi
∂yi
)2
(α− 1)xα−3i
(
αxi + (2− α) MSi
)
+ α (α− 1) yα−2i(
(α− 1) M
Si
− αxi
)
xα−2i
< 0. (3)
Therefore, the best response curve is a strictly decreasing and concave function for all 0 ≤ yi <
ycr.
In region B, Πi is maximized for a unique xi value such that
∂Π′i
∂xi
= 0 and
∂2Π′i
∂x2i
< 0. The
first order equality condition translates into,
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Figure 4: Best Response Curve
Mpiα
xα−1i y
α
i
(xαi + y
α
i )
2 = Ci. (4)
Differentiating both sides of equation (4) with respect to yi and again substituting equation
(4) we get,
∂xi
∂yi
=
xi
yi
xαi − yαi(
1 + 1
α
)
xαi −
(
1− 1
α
)
yαi
. (5)
The second order inequality condition translates into,
Mpiαx
α−2
i y
α
i
(xαi + y
α
i )
3 ((α− 1) yαi − (α + 1)xαi ) < 0
⇒
(
1 +
1
α
)
xαi −
(
1− 1
α
)
yαi > 0. (6)
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So the denominator of the right hand side of equation (5) is positive. Therefore, ∂xi
∂yi
= 0 if
and only if xi = yi,
∂xi
∂yi
> 0 if and only if xi > yi and
∂xi
∂yi
< 0 if and only if xi < yi. Therefore, the
best response curve xi (yi) in region B has zero slope at xi = yi, is strictly increasing for xi > yi
and strictly decreasing for xi < yi. Substituting xi = yi in equation (4) we get, xi = yi =
αMpi
4Ci
.
Figure 4 describes a typical best response curve as a function of effective competitor fre-
quency. In region A, the effective competitor frequency is so small that airline i attracts a large
market share even with a small frequency. Therefore, the optimal frequency ignoring seating
capacity constraints is so low that, the number of seats is exceeded by the number of passengers
wishing to travel with airline i. As a result, the optimal frequency and the maximum profit
that can be earned by airline i are decided by the aircraft seating capacity constraint. In this
region, the optimal number of flights scheduled by airline i is just sufficient to carry all the
passengers that wish to travel on airline i. In this region, airline i has 100% load factor at the
optimal frequency. With increasing effective competitor frequency, the market share attracted
by airline i reduces and hence fewer flights are required to carry those passengers. Therefore,
the best response curve is strictly decreasing in this region. Once the effective competitor fre-
quency exceeds a critical value ycr, the seating capacity constraint ceases to affect the optimal
frequency decision.
In region B, the effective competitor frequency is sufficiently large due to which the number
of passengers attracted by airline i does not exceed the seating capacity. Therefore, the aircraft
seating capacity constraint becomes redundant in this region. The optimal frequency is equal
to the frequency at which the marginal revenue equals marginal cost, which is a constant Ci.
As the effective competitor frequency increases, the market share of airline i at the optimal
frequency decreases and the load factor of airline i at optimal frequency also decreases. At
a large value, yth, of effective competitor frequency, the load factor of airline i at its optimal
frequency reduces to a value Ci
piSi
and the optimal profit drops to zero.
For all values of effective competitor frequency above yth, i.e. in region C, there is no positive
frequency for which the airline i can make positive profit. Therefore, the optimal frequency of
airline i in region C is zero.
5 2-Player Game
Let x and y be the frequency of carrier 1 and 2 respectively. The effective competitor frequency
for carrier 1 is y and that for carrier 2 is x. For any pure strategy Nash equilibrium (PSNE),
the competitor frequency for each carrier can belong to any one of the three regions, A, B and
C. So potentially there are 9 different combinations possible. We define the type of a PSNE as
the combination of regions to which the competitor frequency belongs at equilibrium. We will
denote each type by a pair of capital letters denoting the regions. For example, if carrier 1’s
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effective competitor frequency, i.e. y, belongs to region B and carrier 2’s effective competitor
frequency, i.e. x, belongs to region C, then that PSNE is said to be of type BC. Accordingly,
there are 9 different types of PSNE possible for this game, namely AA, AB, AC, BA, BB, BC,
CA, CB and CC.
Frequency competition among carriers is the primary focus of this research. However, it
is important to realize that frequency planning is just one part of the entire airline planning
process. Frequency planning decisions are not taken in isolation, the route planning phase
precedes the frequency planning phase. Once the set of routes to be operated is decided, the
airline proceeds to the decision of the operating frequency on that route. This implicitly means
that once a route is deemed profitable in the route planning phase, frequency planning is the
phase that decides the number of flights per day, which is supposed to be a positive number.
However, in AA, AB, BA, AC or CA type equilibria, the equilibrium frequency of at least one of
the carriers is zero, which is inconsistent with the actual airline planning process. Moreover, for
ease of modeling, we have made a simplifying assumption that the seating capacity is constant.
In reality, seating capacities are chosen considering the estimated demand in a market. If the
demand for an airline in a market exceeds available seats on a regular basis, the airline would
be inclined to use larger aircraft. Sustained presence of close to 100% load factors is a rarity.
However type AC, BC, CA, CB and CC type equilibria involve one or both carriers having
100% load factors. Zero frequency and 100% load factors make all types of equilibria, apart
from type BB equilibrium, suspect in terms of their portrayal of reality.
We will now investigate each of these possible types of pure strategy equilibria of this game
and obtain the existence and uniqueness conditions for each of them.
5.1 Existence and Uniqueness
Proposition 1. A type AA equilibrium cannot exist.
Proof. If x∗ = 0 then, Π2 = p2 ∗ min (M,S2y) − C2y, which is maximized at y = MS2 because
C2 < S2p2. So y
∗ > 0 whenever x∗ = 0. So this type of equilibrium cannot exist.
Proposition 2. A type AB (and type BA) equilibrium cannot exist.
Proof. Type AB equilibrium exists if and only if x∗ = 0, y∗ > 0 and PAX2 < S2y∗. As shown
before, if x∗ = 0 then, Π2 is maximized at y = MS2 as long as C2 < S2p2. So PAX2 = M = S2y
∗
whenever x∗ = 0. So this type of equilibrium cannot exist. By symmetry, type BA equilibrium
cannot exist either.
Proposition 3. A type AC equilibrium exists if and only if C1
S1p1
≥ S2
S1
1
α
(α− 1)α−1α and if it
exists, then it is a unique type AC equilibrium.
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Proof. This type of equilibrium requires x∗ = 0 and y∗ = M
S2
. So if an equilibrium of this type
exists, then it must be the unique type AC equilibrium. For this equilibrium to exist, the only
condition we need to check is that M
S2
= y ≥ yth = (α− 1)
α−1
α Mp1
αC1
. For all y∗ = M
S2
, x∗ = 0
is true if and only if Π1 ≤ 0, for all x ≥ 0. So type AC equilibrium will exist if and only if
C1
S1p1
≥ S2
S1
1
α
(α− 1)α−1α .
By symmetry, a type CA equilibrium exists if and only if C2
S2p2
≥ S1
S2
1
α
(α− 1)α−1α and if it
exists, then it is the unique type CA equilibrium.
Proposition 4. A type BB equilibrium exists if and only if k ≤ ( 1
α−1
) 1
α , 1
k
≤ ( 1
α−1
) 1
α , C1
S1p1
<
α k
α
1+kα
and C2
S2p2
< α 1
1+kα
, where k = C1p2
C2p1
, and if it exists, then it is a unique type BB equilib-
rium.
Proof. In type BB equilibrium, x∗ > 0, y∗ > 0, PAX1 < S1x and PAX2 < S2y. Therefore,
Π1 (x
∗, y∗) = Π′1 (x
∗, y∗) and Π2 (x∗, y∗) = Π′2 (x
∗, y∗). So Π1 and Π2 are both twice continuously
differentiable at (x∗, y∗). So type BB equilibrium exists if and only if there exist x and y such
that
∂Π′1
∂x
= 0,
∂Π′2
∂y
= 0,
∂2Π′1
∂x2
≤ 0, ∂2Π′2
∂y2
≤ 0,Π′1 ≥ 0,Π′2 ≥ 0,M x
α
xα+yα
< S1x and M
yα
xα+yα
< S2y.
Solving the two FOCs simultaneously, we get x = αMp1
C1
kα
(1+kα)2
and y = αMp1
C1
kα+1
(1+kα)2
. So if this
equilibrium exists, then it must be the unique type BB equilibrium.
The second order conditions (SOCs) can be simplified to k ≤ (α+1
α−1
) 1
α and 1
k
≤ (α+1
α−1
) 1
α .
Also the Π′1 ≥ 0 and Π′2 ≥ 0 translate into,
k ≤
(
1
α− 1
) 1
α
(7)
and
1
k
≤
(
1
α− 1
) 1
α
. (8)
Conditions (7) and (8) make the second order conditions redundant. Finally, the last two
conditions translate into,
C1
S1p1
< α
kα
1 + kα
(9)
and
C2
S2p2
< α
1
1 + kα
. (10)
Therefore, type BB equilibrium exists if and only if conditions (7), (8), (9) and (10) are
satisfied.
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Proposition 5. A type BC equilibrium exists if and only if C1
p1S1
S1
S2
≤ (α− 1)α−1α , kα
1+kα
≤
1
α
, 1
1+kα
≤ 1
α
C2
p2S2
and 1
α
C1
p1S1
≥ 1
1+
(
S1
S2
) α
α−1
, where k = C1p2
C2p1
, and if it exists, then it is a unique
type BC equilibrium.
Proof. In type BC equilibrium, x∗ > 0, y∗ > 0, PAX1 < S1x and PAX2 = S2y. Therefore
Π1 (x
∗, y∗) = Π′1 (x
∗, y∗). So Π1 (x) is twice continuously differentiable at (x∗, y∗). For local
maxima of Π2 at (x
∗, y∗), we need Π′2 = Π
′′
2 and
∂Π′2
∂y
≤ 0.
A type BC equilibrium then exists if and only if there exists (x, y) such that
∂Π′1
∂x
= 0,Π′2 =
Π′′2,
∂2Π′1
∂x2
≤ 0, ∂Π′2
∂y
≤ 0,Π′1 ≥ 0 and M x
α
xα+yα
< S1x. The first two conditions translate into,
xα−1yα
(xα + yα)2
=
C1
αMp1
and
yα
xα + yα
=
S2
M
y.
Solving these two equations simultaneously we get,
x =
(
MC1
αp1S22
) 1
α−1
y
α−2
α−1 (11)
and
(
yS2
M
) 1
α−1
−
(
yS2
M
) α
α−1
−
(
C1
αp1S2
) α
α−1
= 0. (12)
The nonnegativity condition on airline 1’s profit implies that Mp1
xα
xα+yα
≥ C1x. Substituting
equation (11) and (12) we get,
yS2
M
≤ 1
α
. (13)
The LHS of equation (12) is a strictly increasing function of y for yS2
M
< 1
α
. Therefore, there
exists a y that satisfies equation (12) and inequality (13) if and only if
(
1
α
) 1
α−1 − ( 1
α
) α
α−1 −(
C1
αp1S2
) α
α−1 ≥ 0, i.e. if and only if
C1
p1S1
S1
S2
≤ (α− 1)α−1α , (14)
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and if it exists, then it is unique. Therefore, if a type BC equilibrium exists, then it must
be a unique type BC equilibrium.
Simplifying the second order condition and substituting equation (11) and equation (12),
we get yS2
M
≤ α+1
2α
. Therefore, condition (13) makes the second order condition redundant.
First order condition on Π′2 (y) simplifies to
x
y
≤ C2p1
C1p2
. Substituting equation (11) and
equation (12) we get,
yS2
M
≥ k
α
1 + kα
. (15)
Therefore, there exists a y that satisfies equation (12), inequality (13) and inequality (15)
if and only if
kα
1 + kα
≤ 1
α
and
(
C1
αp1S2
) α
α−1
≥
(
kα
1 + kα
) 1
α−1
−
(
kα
1 + kα
) α
α−1
⇐⇒ k
α
1 + kα
≤ 1
α
(16)
and
1
1 + kα
≤ 1
α
C2
p2S2
. (17)
Finally, the last condition, i.e. the condition that the seating capacity exceeds the number of
passengers for airline 1, simplifies to x
α−1
yα−1 ≤ S1S2 . Substituting equation (11) we get,
yS2
M
≥ C1
αp1S1
. (18)
Combining with inequality (13) we get, a
α
≥ yS2
M
≥ C1
αp1S1
. Therefore, there exists a y that
satisfies equation (12), inequality (13) and inequality (18) if and only if,
(
C1
αp1S2
) α
α−1
≥
(
C1
αp1S1
) 1
α−1
−
(
C1
αp1S1
) α
α−1
⇐⇒ 1
α
C1
p1S1
≥ 1
1 +
(
S1
S2
) α
α−1
. (19)
Therefore, type BC equilibrium exists if and only if inequality conditions (14), (16), (17)
and (19) are satisfied.
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By symmetry, a type CB equilibrium exists if and only if C2
p2S2
S2
S1
≤ (α− 1)α−1α , 1
1+kα
≤
1
α
, k
α
1+kα
≤ 1
α
C1
p1S1
, 1
α
C2
p2S2
≥ 1
1+
(
S2
S1
) α
α−1
, and if it exists, then it is a unique CB type equilibrium.
Proposition 6. A type CC equilibrium exists if and only if
(
S2
S1
) α
α−1
1+
(
S2
S1
) α
α−1
≤ 1
α
C1
S1p1
and 1
1+
(
S2
S1
) α
α−1
≤
1
α
C2
S2p2
, and if it exists, then it is a unique type CC equilibrium.
Proof. For type CC equilibrium, x > 0, y > 0, PAX1 = S1x and PAX2 = S2y. Existence of
local maxima of Π1 at x = x
∗ requires that ∂Π
′
1
∂x
≤ 0. Similarly existence of local maxima of Π2 at
y = y∗ requires that ∂Π
′
2
∂y
≤ 0. So for a type CC equilibrium to exist at (x, y), the necessary and
sufficient conditions to be satisfied are x
α
xα+yα
M = S1x,
yα
xα+yα
M = S2y,
∂Π′1
∂x
≤ 0 and ∂Π′2
∂y
≤ 0.
Solving the two equalities simultaneously we get, x = M
S1
(
1+
(
S2
S1
) α
α−1
) and y = M
S2
(
1+
(
S1
S2
) α
α−1
) .
Therefore, if a type CC equilibrium exists, then it must be the unique type CC equilibrium.
The two inequality conditions translate into,
(
S2
S1
) α
α−1
1 +
(
S2
S1
) α
α−1
≤ 1
α
C1
S1p1
(20)
and
1
1 +
(
S2
S1
) α
α−1
≤ 1
α
C2
S2p2
. (21)
Therefore, equation (20) and equation (21) together are necessary and sufficient conditions
for type CC equilibrium to exist.
In any 2-player game, out of 9 possible types, 6 types of equilibria, namely AC, CA, BB,
BC, CB and CC may exist depending on operating cost, fare and seating capacity values.
Furthermore, all the necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence and uniqueness of
each type of equilibrium can be expressed in terms of only 5 dimensionless parameters namely,
r1 =
C1
p1S1
, r2 =
C2
p2S2
, k = C1p2
C2p1
, l = S1
S2
and α, out of which l can be expressed as a function of
the rest as l = k r2
r1
. So there are only 4 independent parameters, which completely describe a
2-player frequency game. The total passenger demand M plays no part in any of the conditions.
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5.2 Realistic Parameter Ranges
Up to 6 different pure strategy Nash equilibria may exist for a 2-player game depending on game
parameters. Apart from α, the flight operating costs, seating capacities and fares are the only
determinants of these parameters. In order to identify realistic ranges of these parameters, we
looked at all the domestic segments in the United States with exactly 2 carriers providing non-
stop service. There are 157 such segments that satisfied this criteria. Many of these markets
cannot be classified as pure duopoly situations because passenger demand on many of these
origin-destination pairs is served not only by the nonstop itineraries, but also by connecting
itineraries offered by several carriers, often including the two carriers providing the nonstop
service. Moreover, one or both endpoints for many of these non-stop segments are important
hubs of one or both of these nonstop carriers, which means that connecting passengers traveling
on this segment also play an important role in the profitability of this segment. Therefore,
modeling these nonstop markets as pure duopoly cases can be a gross approximation. Our
aim is not to capture all these effects into our frequency competition model but rather to
identify realistic relative values of flight operating costs, seating capacities and fares. Despite
these complications, these 157 segments are the real-world situations that come closest to the
simplified frequency competition model that we have considered. Therefore, data from these
markets were used to narrow down our modeling focus. Figure 5 shows the histograms of k, S1
S2
and C
pS
. All k values were found to lie in the range 0.4 to 2.5, all S1
S2
were in the range 0.5 to 2
and all C
pS
values were found to lie in the range 0.18 to 0.8. We will restrict our further analysis
to these ranges of values only. In particular, for later analysis, we will need only one of these
assumptions, which is given by,
Assumption 3. 0.4 ≤ k ≤ 2.5
For α = 1.5, the conditions for type BB equilibrium were satisfied in 144 out of these 157
markets, i.e. almost 92% of the times. Conditions for type AC (or CA) equilibrium were
satisfied in 71 markets, of which 8 were such that the conditions for both type AC and type CA
equilibrium were satisfied together. Conditions for type BC (or CB) equilibrium were satisfied
in only 1 out of 157 markets and conditions for type CC equilibrium were never satisfied. In
all the markets, the conditions for the existence of at least one pure strategy Nash equilibrium
were satisfied. Out of 157 markets, almost 55% (86 markets) were such that type BB was the
unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
We have already proved that AA, AB and BA type equilibria do not exist. Further, as
discussed above, AC, CA, BC, CB and CC type equilibria are suspect in terms of portrayal of
reality. Therefore, type BB equilibrium appears to be the most reasonable type of equilibrium.
Indeed, the data analysis suggested that the existence conditions for type BB equilibrium were
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Figure 5: Histograms of Parameter Values
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satisfied in most of the markets. So for the purpose of analyzing learning dynamics we will only
consider the type BB equilibrium.
Now, we propose two alternative dynamics for the non-equilibrium situations.
5.3 Myopic Best Response Dynamic
Consider an adjustment process where the two players take turns to adjust their own frequency
decision so that each time it is the best response to the frequency chosen by the competitor
in the previous period. If xi and yi is the frequency decision by each carrier in period i, then
xi is the best response to yi−1 and yi−1 is the best response to xi−2 etc. We will prove the
convergence of this dynamics for two representative values of α namely α = 1 and α = 1.5.
We chose these two values because they correspond to two disparate beliefs about the market
share-frequency share relationship. There is nothing specific about these two values that makes
the algorithm converge. In fact given any value in between, we would probably be able to come
up with a proof of convergence. But due to space constraints we will restrict our attention to
these two specific values of α.
Let us define χ = xα and γ = yα. We will often use the χ − γ coordinate system in this
section. Without any loss of generality, we assume that k = C1p2
C2p1
≤ 1. We will denote the
best response functions as xBR (y) and yBR (x) in the x − y coordinate system and as χBR (γ)
and γBR (χ) in the χ − γ coordinate system. Consider a two-dimensional interval I given by
xlb ≤ x ≤ xub, ylb ≤ y ≤ yub where,
yub =
αMp2
4C2
xub = xBR (yub)
ylb = yBR (xub)
xlb = xBR (ylb)
Figure 6 provides a pictorial depiction of interval I.
Proposition 7. As long as the competitor frequency for each carrier remains in region B,
regardless of the starting point: (a) the myopic best response algorithm will reach a point in
interval I in a finite number of iterations, (b) once inside interval I, it will never leave the
interval.
Proof. Let us denote the frequency decisions of the two carriers after the ith iteration by xi and
yi respectively. At the beginning of the algorithm the frequency values are arbitrarily chosen
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Figure 6: Best Response Curves in 2-player Game
to be x0 and y0. If i ≥ 0 is odd, then xi = xBR (yi−1) and yi = yi−1. If i ≥ 0 is even, then
yi = yBR (x
i−1) and xi = xi−1.
Therefore for all i ≥ 2, xi is a best response to some y and yi is a best response to some x.
Best response curve xBR (y) in region B has a unique maximum at y =
αMp1
4C1
with xBR
(
αMp1
4C1
)
=
αMp1
4C1
. By symmetry, the best response curve yBR (x) in region B has a unique maximum at
x = αMp2
4C2
with yBR
(
αMp2
4C2
)
= αMp2
4C2
. k ≤ 1 implies that αMp2
4C2
≤ αMp1
4C1
. Therefore, yi ≤ αMp2
4C2
=
yub for all i ≥ 2. ∂xBR∂y > 0 for y < αMp14C1 . Therefore, for all i ≥ 3, xi = xBR (yi−1) ≤ xBR (yub) =
xub. So for all i ≥ 3, yi ≤ yub and xi ≤ xub.
Let us now prove that the type BB equilibrium point (xeq, yeq) is contained inside interval I.
yeq is a best response to xeq. Therefore, yeq ≤ αMp24C2 = yub. For k ≤ 1, xeq =
αMp2
4C2
4kα−1
(1+kα)2
≥ αMp2
4C2
and yeq =
αMp1
4C1
4kα+1
(1+kα)2
≤ αMp1
4C1
.
For all yeq ≤ y ≤ yub, ∂xBR∂y ≥ 0⇒ xeq = xBR (yeq) ≤ xBR (yub) = xub.
For all xeq ≤ x ≤ xub, ∂yBR∂x ≤ 0⇒ yeq = yBR (xeq) ≥ yBR (xub) = ylb.
For all ylb ≤ y ≤ yeq, ∂xBR∂y ≥ 0⇒ xeq = xBR (yeq) ≥ xBR (ylb) = xlb.
Thus, we have proved that xlb ≤ xeq ≤ xub, ylb ≤ yeq ≤ yub, that is, the type BB equilibrium
is contained inside interval I.
Because of existence of a unique type BB equilibrium, the best response curves intersect
each other at exactly one point denoted by (xeq, yeq). Further, for all x < xeq and for all y < yeq,
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the yBR curve is above the xBR curve and xBR curve is to the right of yBR curve. Also, for all
y < yeq, xBR (y) < xeq. Therefore, for all xi < xeq, if i is odd then xi+1 = xi, yi < yi+1 ≤ yub
and if i is even then xi < xi+1 < xeq, yi+1 = yi. So in each iteration, either xi or yi keeps strictly
increasing until yi ≥ yeq. In the very next iteration, xi+1 = xBR (yi) ≥ xeq and yi+1 = yi ≥ yeq.
Thus, xlb ≤ xeq ≤ xi+1 ≤ xub and ylb ≤ yeq ≤ yi+1 ≤ yub. We have proved part (a) of the
proposition.
We have already proved that at the end of any iteration i ≥ 2, xi ≤ xub and yi ≤ yub. So
for all i such that xlb ≤ xi ≤ xub and ylb ≤ yi ≤ yub, all that remains to be proved is that
xlb ≤ xi+1 and ylb ≤ yi+1. We first consider the case where i is even. yi+1 = yi. As proved
earlier, for all y such that ylb ≤ y ≤ yub, ∂xBR∂y ≥ 0. Therefore, ylb ≤ yi ≤ yub ⇒ xlb = xBR (ylb) ≤
xBR (yi) = xi+1 ≤ xBR (yub) = xub. Therefore, xlb ≤ xi+1 ≤ xub and ylb ≤ yi+1 ≤ yub. Now
consider the case where i is odd. xi+1 = xi. For all xi such that xeq ≤ xi ≤ xub, ∂yBR∂x ≤ 0.
Therefore, ylb = yBR (xub) ≤ yBR (xi) = yi+1. On the other hand, for all xi < xeq, yi < αMp14C1 ,
yi+1 = yBR (xi) > yi ≥ ylb. Therefore, if xlb ≤ xi ≤ xub, then ylb ≤ yi+1. Thus we have proved
that xlb ≤ xi+1 ≤ xub and ylb ≤ yi+1 ≤ yub, if i is odd. Therefore, for any i such that (xi, yi) is
in interval I, (xi+1, yi+1) is also in interval I. We have proved part (b) of the proposition.
Now we will prove that the absolute value of the slope of each of the best response curves
inside interval I is less than 1 in the χ−γ coordinates. We will prove this for two representative
values of α namely, α = 1.5 and α = 1.
Proposition 8. For α = 1.5, the absolute value of the slope of each of the best response curves
inside interval I is less than 1 in the χ− γ coordinates.
Proof. We will first prove that at x = xub, |∂γBR(χ)∂χ | < 1.
∂γBR (χ)
∂χ
= −αγ
χ
1− γ
χ
(α + 1) γ
χ
− (α− 1)
The denominator of the right hand side (RHS) is always positive, due to the second order
conditions. At x = xub, x ≥ yBR (x), and hence, ∂γBR(χ)∂χ ≤ 0. For α = 1.5, solving for the point
where ∂γBR(χ)
∂χ
= −1, leads to a unique solution given by (x−1, y−1), where,
y−1 =
9
32
Mp2
C2
and x−1 = 3
2
3
9
32
Mp2
C2
.
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Because xub = xBR
(
αMp2
4C2
)
, we get,
4
k
=
(
4C2xub
1.5Mp2
)2.5
+ 2
(
4C2xub
1.5Mp2
)
+
(
4C2xub
1.5Mp2
)−0.5
.
Define f (x) =
(
4C2x
1.5Mp2
)2.5
+ 2
(
4C2x
1.5Mp2
)
+
(
4C2x
1.5Mp2
)−0.5
. f (x) is a strictly increasing function
of x for x ≥ 1.5Mp2
4C2
. f (xub) =
4
k
and f (x−1) ≈ 6.96. f (xub) < f (x−1) if and only if k ≥ 0.575,
which is always satisfied because one of the necessary conditions for the existence of type BB
equilibrium requires that k ≥ (α− 1) 1α = 0.5 23 > 0.575. Therefore, xub < x−1. Thus, we have
proved that at x = xub, −1 < ∂γBR(χ)∂χ < 0.
Also for x ≥ αMp2
4C2
, ∂yBR
∂x
≤ 0, therefore y−1 = yBR (x−1) < yBR (xub) = ylb. Next, we will
obtain the coordinates of the point (which turns out to be unique) such that ∂χBR(γ)
∂γ
= 1 and
prove that the y-coordinate at this point is less than ylb. The condition,
∂χBR (γ)
∂γ
= 1.5
χ
γ
χ
γ
− 1
(1.5 + 1) χ
γ
− (1.5− 1) = 1,
can be simplified to obtain,
x ≈ 0.20291.5Mp1
C1
and y ≈ 0.10911.5Mp1
C1
.
Because k ≥ (α− 1) 1α = 0.5 23 > 0.589, we get ylb > y−1 > 0.10911.5Mp1C1 . So the y-coordinate
of the point at which ∂χBR(γ)
∂γ
= 1 is less than ylb. Because
∂χBR(γ)
∂γ
≥ 0 throughout interval I,
0 ≤ ∂χBR(γ)
∂γ
< 1 for the χBR (γ) curve at y = ylb.
Now, let us obtain the coordinates of the point (which turns out to be unique) such that
∂γBR(χ)
∂χ
= 1 and prove that the x-coordinate of this point is less than xlb. Solving for
∂γBR(χ)
∂χ
= 1
we get,
y ≈ 0.20291.5Mp2
C2
and x ≈ 0.10911.5Mp2
C2
.
In order to prove that 0.10911.5Mp2
C2
< xlb = xBR (ylb), it is sufficient to prove that the y-
coordinate of the point on the lower part of xBR (y) curve at which x = 0.1091
1.5Mp2
C2
is less than
y−1 = 932
Mp2
C2
. This is easy to prove because for y < αMp1
4C1
, the xBR (y) curve lies below y = x
23
line. Therefore, the y-coordinate corresponding to x = 0.10911.5Mp2
C2
is less than 0.10911.5Mp2
C2
which is less than 9
32
Mp2
C2
. Therefore, at x = xlb,
∂γBR(χ)
∂χ
< 1.
So far we have proved that −1 < ∂γBR(χ)
∂χ
≤ 0 at x = xub and ∂γBR(χ)∂χ < 1 at x = xlb.
Therefore, −1 < ∂γBR(χ)
∂χ
< 1 for all x such that xlb ≤ x ≤ xub. Also we have proved that
0 ≤ ∂χBR(γ)
∂γ
< 1 at y = ylb and 0 ≤ ∂χBR(γ)∂γ at y = yub. Therefore, −1 < ∂χBR(γ)∂γ < 1 for all y
such that ylb ≤ y ≤ yub.
Therefore for α = 1.5, the absolute value of the slopes of each of the best response curves
inside interval I is less than 1 in the χ− γ coordinates.
Proposition 9. For α = 1, the absolute value of the slope of each of the best response curves
inside interval I is less than 1 in the χ− γ coordinates.
Proof. For α = 1, the χ− γ coordinate system is the same as the x− y coordinate system. We
will first prove that at x = xub, |∂γBR(χ)∂χ | < 1.
For α = 1,
∂γBR (χ)
∂χ
= −1
2
(
1− γ
χ
)
> −1
2
.
We know that at x = xub,
∂γBR(χ)
∂χ
≤ 0. Therefore, x = xub, |∂γBR(χ)∂χ | < 1.
Next, we will obtain the coordinates of the point (which turns out to be unique) such
that ∂χBR(γ)
∂γ
= 1 and prove that the y-coordinate at this point is less than ylb. Solving for
∂χ(γBR)
∂γ
=
χ
γ
−1
2
= 1, we get,
x =
3Mp1
16C1
and y =
Mp1
16C1
.
For x ≥ Mp2
4C2
, we have ∂γBR(χ)
∂χ
≤ 0 and for y ≤ Mp1
4C1
, we have ∂χBR(γ)
∂γ
≥ 0. yub = Mp24C2 ≤
Mp1
4C1
.
So xub = xBR (yub) ≤ xBR
(
Mp1
4C1
)
= Mp1
4C1
. So we get ylb = yBR (xub) ≥ yBR
(
Mp1
4C1
)
. As per the
first order conditions,
Mp1
4C1(
yBR
(
Mp1
4C1
)
+ Mp1
4C1
)2 = C2Mp2 ⇐⇒ yBR
(
Mp1
4C1
)
=
Mp1
4C1
(
2
√
k − 1
)
.
ylb ≥ yBR
(
Mp1
4C1
)
= Mp1
4C1
(
2
√
k − 1
)
> Mp1
16C1
because k ≥ 0.4. Therefore, the y coordinate of
the point where ∂χBR(γ)
∂γ
= 1 is less than ylb.
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Now, let us obtain the coordinates of the point (which turns out to be unique) such that
∂γBR(χ)
∂χ
= 1 and prove that the x-coordinate of this point is less than xlb. Solving for
∂γBR(χ)
∂χ
= 1,
we get,
x =
Mp2
16C2
and y =
3Mp2
16C2
.
Because Mp1
4C1
≥ ylb > Mp116C1 , and
∂χBR(γ)
∂γ
> 0 for y < Mp1
4C1
, we get xlb = xBR (ylb) >
xBR
(
Mp1
16C1
)
= 3Mp1
16C1
> Mp2
16C2
. The last inequality holds because k ≤ 1. Therefore, the x co-
ordinate at the point where ∂γBR(χ)
∂χ
= 1 is less than xlb.
Thus we have proved that −1 < ∂γBR(χ)
∂χ
≤ 0 at x = xub and ∂γBR(χ)∂χ < 1 at x = xlb.
Therefore, −1 < ∂γBR(χ)
∂χ
< 1 for all x such that xlb ≤ x ≤ xub. Also we have proved that
0 ≤ ∂χBR(γ)
∂γ
< 1 at y = ylb and 0 ≤ ∂χBR(γ)∂γ at y = yub. Therefore, −1 < ∂χBR(γ)∂γ < 1 for all y
such that ylb ≤ y ≤ yub.
Therefore, for α = 1, the absolute value of the slopes of each of the best response curves
inside interval I is less than 1 in the χ− γ coordinates.
In order to prove the next proposition, we assume that the absolute value of slope of each
of the best response curves is less than 1 in interval I.
Proposition 10. If the absolute value of slope of each of the best response curves is less than
1 in interval I, then as long as the competitor frequency for each carrier remains in region B,
regardless of the starting point, the myopic best response algorithm converges to the unique type
BB equilibrium.
Proof. We have assumed that the absolute value of slope of each of the best response curves is
less than 1 in interval I. Also we have proved that as long as the competitor frequency for each
carrier remains in region B, regardless of the starting point the myopic best response algorithm
will reach a point in interval I in a finite number of iterations and once inside interval I, it will
never leave the interval.
Let (χeq, γeq) be the type BB equilibrium point in the χ− γ coordinate system. We define
a sequence L (i) as follows:
L (i) =
{
|χi − χeq| if i is odd
|γi − γeq| if i is even.
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Let us consider any iteration i after the algorithm has reached inside the interval I. We will
prove that once inside interval I, L (i) is strictly decreasing.
Let us first consider the case where i is odd. L (i) = |χi − χeq|. In the (i+ 1)th iteration, χ
value remains unchanged. Only the γ value changes from γi to γi+1.
L (i+ 1) = |γi+1 − γeq| = |γBR (χi)− γBR (χeq) | = |
χi∫
χeq
(
∂γ (χ)
∂χ
)
dχ|
≤ |
χi∫
χeq
|∂γ (χ)
∂χ
|dχ| < |
χi∫
χeq
1dχ| = |χi − χeq| = L (i)
We have proved that once inside interval I, L (i) is strictly decreasing for odd values of
i. By symmetry, the same is true for even values of i. Moreover, L (i) = 0 if and only if
x = xeq and y = yeq. Therefore, L (i) is a decreasing sequence which is bounded below. So it
converges to the unique type BB equilibrium point.
Proposition 11. Regardless of the starting point, the myopic best response algorithm converges
to the unique type BB equilibrium as long as the following conditions are satisfied.
αMp1
4C1
< xth
αMp2
4C2
< yth
xcr < xBR (yth)
ycr < yBR (xth)
xcr < xBR (ycr)
ycr < yBR (xcr)
Proof. First we develop sufficient conditions under which the competitor frequency for each
carriers remains in region B for all iterations i ≥ 2, regardless of the starting point.
As proved earlier, the shape of the best response curve yBR (x) is such that at x = 0, y =
M
S2
.
It is initially strictly decreasing followed by a point of nondifferentiability (at xcr) beyond
which it is strictly increasing until a local maximum is reached at x = αMp2
4C2
. Beyond the local
maximum, it is strictly decreasing again to a point of discontinuity (at xth), beyond which it
takes a constant value 0. For x ≤ xth, the only candidates for global minima of the best response
26
curve yBR (x) are xcr and xth. The only candidates for global maxima are x = 0 and x =
αMp2
4C2
.
If the y-coordinate at each of these four important points lies in the range ycr < y < yth, then
ycr < yBR (x) < yth for all x < xth. Similarly, if xBR (y) at y = 0, y = ycr, y =
αMp1
4C1
, and y = yth
are all in the range xcr < x < xth, then xcr < xBR (y) < xth for all y < yth. So for any starting
point x0 such that x0 < xth, the algorithm will remain in the region B of both carriers for all
subsequent iterations. The only remaining case is when x ≥ xth or y ≥ yth. This does not pose
any problem because for all x ≥ xth, xBR (yBR (x)) = xBR (0) and xcr < xBR (0) = MS2 < xth.
So if the aforementioned conditions are satisfied, then regardless of the starting point, the
algorithm will remain in the region B of both carriers for all iterations i such that i ≥ 2.
For all the aforementioned conditions to be satisfied, it is sufficient to ensure that the upper
bound conditions on the points of local maxima are satisfied and the lower bound conditions
on the points of local minima are satisfied. Let us first look at the upper bounds on the points
of local maxima. There are 4 such conditions per carrier, namely M
S1
< xth,
M
S2
< yth,
αMp1
4C1
< xth
and αMp2
4C2
< yth.
M
S1
< xth simplifies to,
C2
S2p2
<
S1
S2
1
α
(α− 1)α−1α
which is the exact negation of the condition for existence of type CA equilibrium. Because we
have assumed that the only unique PSNE in this game is a type BB equilibrium, a type CA
equilibrium cannot exist. Hence this condition is automatically satisfied. By symmetry, due to
the non-existence of a type AC equilibrium, the condition M
S2
< yth is automatically satisfied.
The remaining six conditions are as follows:
αMp1
4C1
< xth
αMp2
4C2
< yth
xcr < xBR (yth)
ycr < yBR (xth)
xcr < xBR (ycr)
ycr < yBR (xcr)
If each of these conditions is satisfied then the myopic best response algorithm converges to
the unique type BB equilibrium, regardless of the starting point.
Out of the 157 records of 2-player cases analyzed for the domestic US segments, 86 segments
were such that the only PSNE was a type BB equilibrium. In each and every one of these 86
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cases, all the 6 conditions mentioned above were satisfied. Therefore, for each of these 86 cases,
the myopic best response dynamic converges to the unique type BB equilibrium point regardless
of the starting point. Thus the data analysis suggests that these conditions are very mild.
5.4 Alternative Dynamic
This dynamic is applicable only in the part of region B where the utility function is strictly
concave i.e. we will consider the region where α−1
α+1
+  ≤
(
x
y
)α
≤ α+1
α−1 − , where  is any
sufficiently small positive number. This requirement is not very restrictive. This condition is
always satisfied at the type BB equilibrium, due to the second order conditions. Moreover, the
x
y
values satisfying this condition cover a large region surrounding the type BB equilibrium. For
example, for α = 1, this condition is always satisfied for all values of x
y
, while for α = 1.5, the
condition translates approximately to 0.342 ≤ x
y
≤ 2.924, which is a large range. In order to
provide a complete specification of the player utilities, we will define the player i utility outside
this region by means of a quadratic function of a single variable xi. The coefficients are such
that ui (xi) and its first and second order derivatives with respect to xi are continuous.
Multiplying the utility function by a positive real number is an order preserving transfor-
mation, which does not affect the properties of the game. We will multiply the utility of player
i by 1
pi
. So ui =
Πi
pi
. This dynamic was proposed by Rosen [19]. Under this dynamic, each
player changes his strategy such that his own utility would increase if all the other players held
to their current strategies. The rate of change of each player’s strategy with time is equal to
the gradient of his utility with respect to his own strategy, subject to constraints. For the
frequency competition game, where each player’s strategy space is 1-dimensional, the rate of
change of each player’s strategy simply equals the derivative of the player’s utility with respect
to the frequency decision, subject to the upper and lower bound on allowable frequency values.
Therefore, the rate of adjustment of each player’s strategy is given by,
dxi
dt
=
dui (x)
dxi
+ bmin − bmax.
The only purpose of the summation term is to ensure that the frequency values stay within
the allowable range, xmin ≤ x ≤ xmax. bmin will be equal to 0 for all x > xmin and will take an
appropriate positive value at x = xmin to ensure that the lower bound is respected. Similarly,
bmax will be equal to 0 for all x < xmax and will take an appropriate positive value at x = xmax
to ensure that the upper bound is respected. As long as the competitor frequencies remain in
region B for each carrier, the utilities are given by:
28
u1 (x, y) = M
xα
xα + yα
− C1
p1
x and u2 (x, y) = M
yα
xα + yα
− C2
p2
y.
The vector of utility functions u (x, y) is given by: u (x, y) = [u1 (x, y) , u2 (x, y)]. The vector
of first order derivatives of each player’s utility with respect to his own frequency is given by:
∇u (x, y) = [∂u1(x,y)
∂x
, ∂u2(x,y)
∂y
]. The Jacobian of ∇u is given by: U (x, y) =
(
∂2u1(x,y)
∂x2
∂2u1(x,y)
∂x∂y
∂2u2(x,y)
∂y∂x
∂2u2(x,y)
∂y2
)
The first order derivatives are given by,
∂u1 (x, y)
∂x
=
Mαxα−1yα
(xα + yα)2
− C1
p1
and
∂u2 (x, y)
∂y
=
Mαyα−1xα
(xα + yα)2
− C2
p2
,
and the second order derivatives are given by,
[U (x, y)]11 =
∂2u1 (x, y)
∂x2
=
Mαxα−2yα
(xα + yα)3
((α− 1) yα − (α + 1)xα) < 0
[U (x, y)]22 =
∂2u2 (x, y)
∂y2
=
Mαyα−2xα
(xα + yα)3
((α− 1)xα − (α + 1) yα) < 0
[U (x, y)]12 =
∂2u1 (x, y)
∂x∂y
=
Mα2xα−1yα−1
(xα + yα)3
(xα − yα)
[U (x, y)]21 =
∂2u2 (x, y)
∂y∂x
=
Mα2xα−1yα−1
(xα + yα)3
(yα − xα)
⇒ [(U (x, y) + UT (x, y))]11 = 2[U (x, y)]11
and [
(
U (x, y) + UT (x, y)
)
]22 = 2[U (x, y)]22
and [
(
U (x, y) + UT (x, y)
)
]12 = [
(
U (x, y) + UT (x, y)
)
]12 = 0.
Therefore,
(
U (x, y) + UT (x, y)
)
is a diagonal matrix with both diagonal elements strictly
negative. Therefore,
(
U (x, y) + UT (x, y)
)
is negative definite. This is sufficient to prove that
the payoff functions are diagonally strictly concave [19]. Therefore, under the alternative dy-
namic mentioned above, the frequencies of the competing carriers will converge to the unique
type BB equilibrium frequencies.
29
6 N-Player Symmetric Game
Now we will extend the analysis to the N-player symmetric case, where N ≥ 2. By symmetry,
we mean that the operating cost Ci, the seating capacity Si and the fare pi is the same for all
carriers. For the analysis presented in this section, it is sufficient to have Ci
pi
constant for all
carriers. However, for computing the price of anarchy in the next section we need the remaining
assumptions. We will simplify the notation and denote the operating cost for each carrier as C,
seating capacity as S and fare as p. Under symmetry, the necessary and sufficient conditions
for the existence of a type BB equilibrium for a 2-player game reduce to a single condition,
αPS
C
> 2. We will assume that this condition holds throughout the following analysis.
Assumption 4. αPS
C
> 2
Proposition 12. In an N-player symmetric game, a symmetric equilibrium with excess seating
capacity exists at xi =
αMp
C
N−1
N2
for all i if and only if N ≤ α
α−1 and if it exists, then it is the
unique symmetric equilibrium.
Proof. The utility of each carrier i is given by ui (xi, yi) = M
xαi
xαi +y
α
i
−C
p
xi, where yi =
(∑N
j=1,j 6=i x
α
j
) 1
α
is the effective competitor frequency for player i. From the FOCs, we get xi =
αMp
C
xαi y
α
i
(xαi +yαi )
2 .
In the symmetric game, Ci
pi
is the same for every player i. In general, this symmetric game
may have both symmetric and unsymmetric equilibria. In a symmetric equilibrium, x1 = x2 =
... = xN . Assume excess seating capacity for each carrier. Substituting in the FOCs we get
yi = (N − 1)
1
α xi. Therefore, xi =
αMp
C
N−1
N2
for all i is the unique solution. Therefore, we
have proved that if an equilibrium exists at this point, then it must be the unique symmetric
equilibrium of this game.
In order to prove that this point is an equilibrium point, we need to prove that the SOC is
satisfied, the profit at this point is non-negative and seating capacity is at least as much as the
demand for each carrier.
The SOC is satisfied if and only if,
∂2Ui
∂x2i
=
Mαxα−2i y
α
i
(xαi + y
α
i )
3 ((α− 1) yαi − (α + 1)xαi ) ≤ 0 ⇐⇒ N ≤
2α
α− 1 .
The condition on non-negativity of profit is satisfied if and only if,
αMp
C
N − 1
N2
∗ C ≤ Mp
N
⇐⇒ N ≤ α
α− 1 .
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The condition of excess seating capacity is satisfied if and only if,
αMp
C
N − 1
N2
∗ S > M
N
⇐⇒ N > α
pS
C
αpS
C
− 1 ,
which is always true for αpS
C
> 2.
Thus the symmetric equilibrium exists if and only if N ≤ α
α−1 .
Proposition 13. In a symmetric N-player game, there exists no unsymmetric equilibrium where
all players have a non-zero frequency and excess seating capacity.
Proof. Let us assume the contrary. For a symmetric N-player game, let there exist an unsym-
metric equilibrium such that all players have a non-zero frequency and excess seating capacity.
Let us define β =
∑N
j=1 x
α
j and ωi =
xαi∑N
j=1 x
α
j
. So xi = (ωiβ)
1
α . Substituting in the FOC, we get,
(ωiβ)
1
α =
αMp
C
ωi (1− ωi)
⇒ C
αMp
β
1
α = ω
α−1
α
i − ω
2α−1
α
i
Let us define a function h (ωi) = ω
α−1
α
i − ω
2α−1
α
i . The value of h (ωi) is the same across all
the players at equilibrium. For all ωi > 0, h (ωi) is a strictly concave function. So it can take
the same value at at most two different values of ωi. So all ωi can take at most two different
values. Let ωi = v1 for m (≤ N) players, and ωi = v2 for the remaining N − m players. Let
v1 > v2, without loss of generality. h (ωi) is maximized at ωi =
α−1
2α−1 . So v2 <
α−1
2α−1 < v1.
At equilibrium, each player’s profit must be non-negative. Therefore, the profit for each
player i such that ωi = v2 is given by Mpωi − Cxi. But xi = αMpC ωi (1− ωi). So the condition
on non-negativity of profit simplifies to, v2 ≥ α−1α . Therefore, α−12α−1 > v2 ≥ α−1α , which can be
true only if α < 1. This leads to a contradiction. So we have proved that for a symmetric
N-player game, there exists no unsymmetric equilibrium such that all players have a non-zero
frequency and excess seating capacity.
Proposition 14. In a symmetric N-player game, there exists some nmin such that for any
integer n with max (2, nmin) ≤ n ≤ min
(
N − 1, α
α−1
)
there exist exactly
(
N
n
)
unsymmetric
equilibria such that exactly n players have non-zero frequency and all players with nonzero
frequency have excess seating capacity. There exists at least one such integer for N ≥ α
α−1 . The
frequency of each player with non-zero frequency equals αMp
C
n−1
n2
.
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Proof. Let us denote this game as G. Consider any equilibrium having exactly n players with
non-zero frequency. Let us rearrange the player indices such that players i = 1 to i = n have
non-zero frequencies. Let us consider a new game which involves only the first n players. We
will denote this new game as G′. An equilibrium of G where only the first n players have a non-
zero frequency is also an equilibrium for the game G′ where all players have non-zero frequency.
As we have already proved, the equilibrium frequencies of each of the first n players must be
equal to αMp
C
n−1
n2
. This ensures that any of the first n players will not benefit from unilateral
deviations from this equilibrium profile. In order to ensure that none of the remaining N − n
players has an incentive to deviate, we must ensure that the effective competitor frequency for
any player j such that j > n must be at least equal to yth. This condition is satisfied if and
only if,
n
1
α
n− 1
n2
αMp
C
≥ (α− 1)(α−1α ) Mp
αC
⇐⇒ n 1−αα − n 1−2αα ≥ (α− 1)
α−1
α
α2
. (22)
LHS is an increasing function of n for n ≤ α
α−1 . Also the RHS is a decreasing function of α
(this can be verified by differentiating the log of RHS with respect to α). Also it can be easily
verified that at n = α
α−1 , the inequality holds for every α. Therefore, for any given α value,
there exists some nmin ≥ 0 such that for all n such that αα−1 ≥ n ≥ nmin, this inequality is
satisfied. As proved earlier, the condition for existence of an equilibrium with all players having
non-zero frequency in game G′ is n ≤ α
α−1 .
So all the conditions for an equilibrium of game G are satisfied if max (2, nmin) ≤ n ≤
min
(
N − 1, α
α−1
)
. Therefore, any equilibrium of game G′ where all players have non-zero
frequency is also an equilibrium of game G where all the remaining players have zero frequency
and vice versa. The players in game G′ can be chosen in
(
N
n
)
ways. Therefore, we have
proved that in a symmetric N-player game, for any integer n such that max (2, nmin) ≤ n ≤
min
(
N − 1, α
α−1
)
, there exist exactly
(
N
n
)
unsymmetric equilibria such that exactly n players
have non-zero frequency. To show that there exists at least one such integer n, consider 2 cases.
If α > 1.5, then it is easy to verify that the inequality (22) is always satisfied for n = 2. If
α ≤ 1.5, then we see that (22) is satisfied by n = 1
α−1 =
α
α−1 − 1. In either case, αα−1 > 2 is
always satisfied. So there always exist some such n. The frequency of each player with non-zero
frequency equals αMp
C
n−1
n2
.
From here onwards, we will denote each such equilibrium as an n-symmetric equilibrium of
an N-player game.
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Proposition 15. Among all equilibria with exactly n players (n ≤ N) having nonzero frequency,
the total frequency is maximum for the symmetric equilibrium.
Proof. As proved earlier, any possible unsymmetric equilibria with exactly n players having
nonzero frequency must involve at least one player with no excess seating capacity. Let player i
be such a player with nonzero frequency and no excess seating capacity at equilibrium. So the
effective competitor frequency y must be at most equal to ycr and xi ≥ xcr = MS
(
1− C
αpS
)
> M
2S
.
Therefore, each such player must carry at least M
2
passengers. Therefore, at equilibrium there
can be at most one such player. So each of the remaining n − 1 players has excess capacity.
Using the same argument as the one used in proving proposition 13, we can prove that each
player with non-zero frequency and excess capacity will have equal frequency at equilibrium.
Let us denote the equilibrium frequency of the sole player with no excess capacity by x1 and
that of each of the remaining players as x2. We will denote the equilibrium market share of
the player with no excess capacity as l. Therefore, the total frequency under the unsymmetric
equilibrium equals,
(n− 1)x2 + x1 = αMp
C
(n− 1)xα2
(n− 1)xα2 + xα1
(
1− x
α
2
(n− 1)xα2 + xα1
)
+
M
S
xα1
(n− 1)xα2 + xα1
=
αMp
C
(1− l)
(
1− 1− l
n− 1
)
+
M
S
l
Let us assume that there exists an unsymmetric equilibrium where the total frequency is
greater than that under the corresponding n-symmetric equilibrium, which equals αMp
C
n−1
n
. This
condition translates into,
αMp
C
(1− l)
(
1− 1− l
n− 1
)
+
M
S
l >
αMp
C
n− 1
n
,
which further simplifies to, nl (5− n− 2l) > 2. But we know that n ∈ I+, n ≥ 2 and l ≥ 1
2
.
So 5 − n − 2l > 0 only if n < 5 − 2l ≤ 4. So n = 2 or n = 3. For n = 2, the conditions for
existence of type BC equilibrium in the 2-player case require αPS
C
≤ 2, which contradicts our
assumption. For n = 3, we need some l such that 3l2 − 3l + 1 < 0, which is true if and only if
3 (l − 0.5)2 + 0.25 < 0, which is also impossible. Thus our assumption leads to a contradiction.
So we have proved that among all equilibria with exactly n players (n ≤ N) having nonzero
frequency, the total frequency is maximum for the symmetric equilibrium.
Proposition 16. There exists no equilibrium with exactly n players with non-zero frequency
such that n > α
α−1 .
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Proof. We already proved that if n > α
α−1 , there exists no equilibrium with all n players having
excess capacity. We have also proved that the number of players without excess capacity can
be at most one. So consider some equilibrium with one player with no excess capacity. Let
the market share of that player be l and let the equilibrium frequency of each of the remaining
players be x2. Because n >
α
α−1 , therefore α >
n
n−1 .
For non-negative profit at equilibrium we require, Mp
C
1−l
n−1 ≥ x2. From the FOC, we get
x2 =
αMp
C
1−l
n−1
(
1− 1−l
n−1
)
. Combining the two we get,
1 ≥ α
(
1− 1− l
n− 1
)
⇒ n
n− 1 < α ≤
n− 1
n+ l − 2 ≤
n− 1
n− 1.5
⇒n < 2,
which is impossible.
Therefore, we have proved that there exists no equilibrium with exactly n players with
non-zero frequency such that n > α
α−1 .
In this section, we proved that for an N-player symmetric game, if N ≤ α
α−1 , then there exists
a fully symmetric equilibrium where the equilibrium frequency of each carrier at equilibrium
is αMp
C
N−1
N2
and there exists no unsymmetric equilibrium with all N players having a non-zero
frequency. On the other hand, if N > α
α−1 , then there exists no equilibrium with all players
having non-zero frequency. In either case, there exist exactly
(
N
n
)
n-symmetric equilibria for
each integer n < N such that max (2, nmin) ≤ n ≤ min
(
N − 1, α
α−1
)
for some nmin ≥ 0.
Additionally, there may be unsymmetric equilibria such that each unsymmetric equilibrium
has exactly one player with 100% load factor, n− 1 more players with non-zero frequency and
excess seating capacity and N − n players with zero frequency. We also proved that there
always exists at least one equilibrium for an N-player symmetric game. The aforementioned
types of equilibria are exhaustive, that is there exist no other types of equilibria. As before, we
realize that all the equilibria except those where all players have a nonzero frequency and excess
capacity are suspect in terms of there portrayal of reality. So the fully symmetric equilibrium
appears to be the most realistic one. In addition, the fully symmetric equilibrium is also the
worst case equilibrium in the sense that it is the equilibrium which has the maximum total
frequency, as will be apparent in the next section.
We proved that for some n′ < N , if there exists no symmetric equilibrium for all n ≥ n′,
then there exists no unsymmetric equilibrium for all n ≥ n′ either. We also proved that for
any given n, the total frequency at each unsymmetric equilibrium having n non-zero frequency
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players is at most equal to the total frequency at the corresponding n-symmetric equilibrium.
These results will help us obtain the price of anarchy in the next section.
7 Price of Anarchy
In any equilibrium, the total revenue earned by all carriers remains equal to Mp. The total
flight operating cost to all carriers is given by
∑n
i=0Cxi = C
∑n
i=0 xi. On the other hand,
if there were a central controller trying to minimize the total operating cost, the minimum
number of flights for carrying all the passengers would be equal to M
S
and the total operating
cost would be MC
S
. Similar to the notion introduced by Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou [15],
let us define the price of anarchy as the ratio of total operating cost at Nash equilibrium to
the total operating cost under the optimal frequency. The denominator is a constant and the
numerator is proportional to the total number of flights.
A large proportion of airport delays are caused by congestion. Congestion related delay at
an airport is an increasing (often nonlinearly) function of the total number of flights. Therefore,
the greater the total number of flights, more is the delay. Total profit earned by all the airlines
in a market is also a decreasing function of the total frequency. Also, because the total number
of passengers remains constant, the average load factor in a market is inversely proportional
to the total frequency. Lower load factors mean more wastage of seating capacity. Thus total
frequency is a good measure of airline profitability, total operating cost, airport congestion and
load factors. Higher total frequency across all carriers in a market means lower profitability,
more cost, more congestion and lower average load factor, assuming constant aircraft size.
Greater the price of anarchy, more is the inefficiency introduced by the competitive behavior of
players at equilibrium.
Proposition 17. In a symmetric N-player game, the price of anarchy is given by αpS
C
n−1
n
, where
n is the largest integer not exceeding min
(
N, α
α−1
)
.
Proof. As proved earlier, a symmetric N-player game has
∑min(N, αα−1)
n=max(2,nmin)
(
N
n
)
equilibria (for
some nmin ≥ 0). such that each equilibrium has a set of exactly n players each with frequency
αMp
C
n−1
n2
and excess capacity, whereas remaining N − n players have zero frequency. Also,
for any n < min
(
N, α
α−1
)
, there may exist equilibria with exactly n players having non-zero
frequency and one of them having no excess capacity at equilibrium. However, the frequency
under any equilibrium with exactly n players having non-zero frequency is at most equal to
the corresponding n-symmetric equilibrium. In any equilibrium having n players with non-zero
frequency, the total flight operating cost is given by αMp
C
n−1
n2
, which is an increasing function
of n. The total cost under minimum cost scheduling would be MS
C
. Therefore, the ratio of
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total cost under equilibrium to total cost under minimum cost scheduling is αpS
C
n−1
n
, which is
an increasing function of n. Also, no equilibrium exists for n > α
α−1 . Therefore, the price of
anarchy is given by αpS
C
n−1
n
, where n is the greatest integer less than equal to min
(
N, α
α−1
)
.
This expression has several important implications. Greater the α value, more is the price
of anarchy. This means that as the market share-frequency share relationship becomes more
and more curved, and goes away from the straight line, greater is the price of anarchy. So the
S-curve phenomenon has a direct impact on airline profitability and airport congestion. Also,
more the airfare compared to the operating cost per seat (i.e. more is the value of pS
C
), greater
is the price of anarchy. In other words, for short-haul, high-fare markets the price of anarchy
is greater. Finally, more the number of competitors, greater is the price of anarchy (up to a
threshold value beyond which it remains constant).
The equilibrium results from this simple model help substantiate some of the claims men-
tioned earlier. The price of anarchy increases because of the S-shaped (rather than linear)
market share-frequency share relationship. Therefore, similar to the suggestions by Button and
Drexler [10] and O’connor [17], the S-curve relationship tends to encourage airlines to provide
excess capacity and schedule greater numbers of flights. Total profitability of all the carriers in
a market under the worst case equilibrium provides a lower bound on airline profitability under
competition. This lower bound is an increasing function of the price of anarchy, which in turn
increases with number of competitors. Therefore, similar to Kahn’s [14] argument, this raises
the question of whether the objectives of a financially strong and highly competitive airline
industry are inherently conflicting. In addition, these results also establish the link between
airport congestion and airline competition. Airport congestion under the worst-case equilibrium
is directly proportional to the price of anarchy. So greater the number of competitors and more
the curvature of the market share-frequency share relationship, greater is the airport congestion
and delays.
8 Summary
In this paper, we modeled airline frequency competition based on the S-curve relationship which
has been well documented in airline literature. Regardless of the exact value of α parameter, it
is usually agreed that market share is an increasing (linear or S-shaped) function of frequency
share. Our model is general enough to accommodate somewhat differing beliefs about the
market share-frequency share relationship. We characterize the best response curves for each
player in a multi-player game. Due to complicated shape of best response curves, we proved that
there exist anywhere between 0 to 6 different equilibria depending on the exact parameter values.
All the existence and uniqueness conditions can be completely described by 3 dimensionless
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parameters (in addition to α) of the game. Only one out of the 6 possible equilibria seemed
reasonable in terms of portrayal of reality. This equilibrium corresponds to both players having
nonzero frequency and less than 100% load factors. In order to narrow down the modeling effort,
realistic parameter ranges were identified based on real world data that come closest to the
simplified models analyzed in this paper. We proposed 2 different myopic learning algorithms
for the 2-player game and proved that under mild conditions, either of them converges to
Nash equilibrium. For the N-player (for any integer N ≥ 2) game with identical players, we
characterized the entire set of possible equilibria and proved that at least one equilibrium always
exists for any such game. The worst case equilibrium was identified. The price of anarchy was
found to be an increasing function of number of competing airlines, ratio of fare to operating
cost per seat and the curvature of S-curve relationship.
This paper presented two central results. First, there are simple myopic learning rules under
which less than perfectly rational players would converge to an equilibrium. This substantiates
the predictive power of the Nash equilibrium concept. Second, the S-curve relationship between
market share and frequency share has direct and negative implications to airline profitability
and airport congestion, as speculated in multiple previous studies.
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